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IMPROVING POLICE PERFORMANCE
THROUGH THE EXCLUSIONARY RULEPART II: DEFINING THE NORMS AND
TRAINING THE POLICE
WAYNE R. LAFAvE*

I cannot concur without pointing out that the courts have been
left to make rules and apply constitutional standards with little,
if any, real knowledge or guidance regarding the difficulties which
face the police in solving such crimes in our crowded metropolitan
centers. Moreover, Congress and the legislatures have failed to
-make appropriate inquiry and statutory provision to meet the
situation.
Chief Judge Lumbard, concurring
United States ex rel.
in Williams v. Fay,
323 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1963)
I doubt that policemen have the time or inclination to read
the opinions of appellate courts, and even if they did so it is hardly
likely they would grasp their full import without sustained expert
guidance. The basic training of a policeman is rarely adequate to
make him understand what he can and cannot do in all situations;
it is unlikely that without some special effort and outside help
he will ever understand what he did wrong in a given case. Moreover, we cannot blame him too meuch for not accepting what he
does not understand.
Judge Burger, Who Will
Watch, the Watchman?, 14
Am. U.L. Rev. 1, 11 (1964)
With rapidly changing techniques and the rapidly changing
legal situation, the police have a tremendous burden of education,
not only for the new members of their departments, but for the
entering recruits. Indeed, in many respects we have to reeducate
twenty-five thousand men every time a new interpretationor new
decision is handed down from the Bench. This puts a terrific
burden on keeping the system up to date.
New York Police Commissioner
Murphy, in A Forum on the
Interrogation of the Accused,
49 Cornell L.Q. 382, 386 (1964)
*Professor of Law, University of Illinois; B.S. 1957, LL.B. 1959, S.J.D. 1965,
University of Wisconsin.
(566)
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A. INTRODUCTION

In part I of this article, appearing in the last issue of this Review,'
it was noted that the principal basis for the exclusion of probative evidence is
that of favorably affecting future police attitudes and practices. Indeed,
the "ultimate test" of the exclusionary rule is said to be whether law
enforcement officers are in fact deterred by the threat of exclusion.2 It
is unfortunate but true that there is not presently available sufficient evidence for a precise measurement of the impact of the exclusionary rule in
current criminal justice administration. Nonetheless, on the evidence that
is available it is possible to make some judgment about whether the
exclusionary rule is doing as good a job of improving police performance
as one might hope and, if it is not, what factors are contributing to this
result.
For the exclusionary rule to be completely effective, it would appear
that (1) the requirements of the law on search and seizure and related
practices must be developed in some detail and in a manner sufficiently
responsive to both the practical needs of enforcement and the individual
right of privacy; (2) these requirements must be set forth in a manner
that can be understood and applied by the front-line lower-echelon police
officer and must be effectively communicated to him; and (3) the police
desire to obtain convictions must be sufficiently great to induce them to
comply with these requirements.
It is fair to say that there are deficiencies in all three respects. As
noted in Part I, the inability of the police to obtain convictions or meaningful convictions against certain offenders has resulted in abandonment
of conviction as an objective in many cases. The result is a program of arrests and searches without concern for the legal requirements, the objective
of which is the imposition of informal sanctions upon the presumably
unconvictable offenders. Moreover, the local court practices described in
Part I further debilitate the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule. The
factual and legal bases of police action often are not adequately presented
at the hearing on the motion to suppress, and in turn the specific grounds
upon which evidence is suppressed are seldom adequately communicated
back to the police. Inconsistencies between the standards of different judges,
1. LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary RulePart I: Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REV. 391 (1965).
2. Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedure: Another Look, 48 Nw.
U. L. REv. 16, 34 (1953).
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between the standards applied for different crimes, and between the
standards applied when warrants are requested and when evidence is
challenged, all contribute to limited police understanding and acceptance of
local judges' supervisory actions.
Although the exclusionary rule itself says nothing about the content of the law on arrest or search and seizure, it is apparent that the
objective behind the rule cannot be realized unless there is contentand, it might be added, content that is both realistic and understandable.
It would be difficult to justify the exclusion of evidence because of police
misconduct if it were not thought possible that the legal system could
provide the police with a reasonably definitive statement of the limitations
on their authority. Indeed, it is often said that the principal benefit to be
derived from the exclusionary rule is the impetus it gives to norm-defining
and police-teaching; the nature of the sanction requires appellate courts to
give repeated attention to police conduct, while its consequences impel legislative activity and renewed training efforts.
To conclude this survey, then, it is necessary (1) to assess the contributions of the legislatures and appellate courts in defining norms of
police conduct; and (2) to determine how effectively these norms are
being communicated to the police via ongoing training efforts. As in Part
I, the basic objective is to identify and understand the factors that tend
to deprive the exclusionary rule of its maximum effectiveness.
B.

NORM-DEFINING BY THE LEGISLATURES

1. Lack of Legislative Action
Because of the practical limitations upon the power of appellate courts
to develop a comprehensive set of norms to govern police action in acquiring evidence, a preference for legislative attention to the subject often
has been stated. Professor Waite explains it this way:
Wise rule-making must be based on comprehensive, accurate knowledge of need and effect. It requires the gathering of
information and its study. It should be the product of various
minds. As a practical matter it should give some heed to public
opinion. A legislature can proceed along such lines. It can order
investigations; it can set up hearings by committees. What it proposes to do, it can reveal in advance. It will then be educated
by pressure groups; it will learn of public opinion through the press.
Its formulations can be a compromise of various ideas and many
minds.
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A court, on the contrary, can do none of these things. It cannot announce tentative conclusions in advance and thereby gain
the wisdom of public discussion. It cannot set up committees of
inquiry; it can neither seek nor acquire information except what is
furnished by partisan attorneys engaged in the trial. Its conclusions
of proper policy can be no more than a voicing of personal opinions
based on the limited empirical knowledge of its individual members.3
Police administrators often have voiced a similar view.' However,
this position is by no means confined to those who might be characterized
as being "police-prosecution oriented."5 The Chief Judge of the United
States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, recently observed:
It is not by judicial action that the intelligence and effectiveness of local police work can be improved. It is not for the judges
to define the powers of investigation and inquiry... In these important areas only Congress and the state legislatures can redress
the balance and provide due process for all the people .... While
the courts must play their part, the Bar should not expect judges
to discover policy and make rules in default of legislative findings
and statutes which, to be effective, must be based on accumulated
experience and an appraisal of competing interests.6
As this comment suggests, the several legislatures have given less
than adequate attention to the need for clear-cut rules on police conduct.
Indeed, a survey of existing codes of criminal procedure reflects minimal
attention to the police stage of the criminal justice process in general
and to the problem of search and seizure in particular. In most states
today, these codes, if they deal with search at all, are confined to setting
forth requirements for a search warrant.7 The statutes not only deal
with the one aspect of search that least involves police decision-making,
but they typically do so in a way that gives little or no attention to the
police role. For the most part, these laws go into considerable detail
3. Waite, Whose Rides? The Problem of Improper Police Methods, 48

A.BA.J. 1057 (1962).

4. See for example, the comments of Superintendent Wilson of Chicago in
Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Moderation, 51 J.
Caim. L., C. & P.S. 395, 396 (1960).
5. Kamisar, On the Tactios of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the
Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436 (1964).
6. Lumbard, The Administration of Criminal Justice: Some Problems and
Their Resolution, 49 A.B.A.J. 840, 846 (1963).
7. See, e.g., § 542.260 RSMo (1959); Aluz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1441 (1956);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-201 (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-33a (Supp. 1964);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 982 (1964); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.79.010 (1961).
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on the authority and responsibility of the magistrate in issuing warrants and in receiving and disposing of property obtained by virtue of
their execution. By comparison, the responsibilities of the police in executing search warrants are dealt with only summarily, if at all.
The other search problems of interest to the police, such as the limitations on search incident to arrest, frisking incident to a field interrogation,
or search of vehicles, are seldom the subject of legislation. Those statutes
that do exist are rarely of recent vintage, and, on their face at least,
may be totally inconsistent with present constitutional limitations on
police conduct. 8
There is little evidence of any renewed efforts by the legislatures
of the several states to become involved in defining norms for police
conduct, notwithstanding the increased role of appellate courts in this
area and the frequent criticism of their decisions.9 Although in recent years
a number of states, stimulated to a large extent by the Model Penal Code,
have undertaken a complete recodification of their substantive criminal
law,10 there has been no corresponding effort to rework the procedural
codes; at present, only Illinois has a completely revised code of criminal
procedure." Piecemeal revision of procedural codes has continued in
other states, but very little of this ad htoc legislative response has clarified
the authority of the police in acquiring physical evidence.' 2 What has been
done, however, has been stimulated in large measure by the existence of
the exclusionary rule.13

8. See, e.g., COLO. Rsv. STAT. § 40-11-1 (1953), making it the duty of the
police "to search without warrant all persons suspected of violating the provisions"
of the statute on carrying concealed weapons.
9. "There has been a law-making vacuum into which the [Supreme] Court
has, willy-nilly, had to rush. Our law-making bodies, federal, state, and local, have
so far defaulted on that job." Packer, Policing the Police, The New Republic, Sept.
4, 1965, p. 17, at 18.
10. Among the states which have passed or plan to enact new substantive
codes are California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin.
11. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 100-1-126-1 (1963). The Code became
effective January 1, 1964. A new criminal procedure code will become effective in
Texas on January 1, 1966. Tex. Laws 1965, ch. 722.
12. Unique in this regard are two recent New York enactments which have
received considerable attention, the "no-knock" statute, N.Y. Code CUIM. PRoC.
§ 799, and the "stop-and-frisk" law, N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180(a).
13. When People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955), imposed the
exclusionary rule in California, an Attorney General's Committee was appointed,
and their recommendations led to considerable new legislation clarifying and codifying the case law on arrest and search and seizure. Kamisar, Public Safety v. In-
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2. Reasons for Legislative Inaction

There appear to be a number of reasons for this failure of the legislatures to establish norms to guide the police. In part, at least, the legislative inaction may be attributable to a generally held view that the definition of standards for police conduct is exclusively a judicial responsibility.
It is true, of course, that constitutional questions are inevitable when dealing with search and seizure and that the courts have had the primary
responsibility in protecting the rights of individuals against governmental
interference. Indeed, the legislatures cannot have the last word on constitutional issues; the "Bill of Rights is a thoroughly undemocratic document"
that forbids "laws which the elected representatives of the people believe
to be desirable." 14 But, even if courts must play a large role,

this does not mean that courts are necessarily equipped to deal
with all of the important issues of criminal justice administration,
particularly those which do not arise in litigation.... [It may be]
doubted whether there can be an orderly, coherent, and systematic
development of criminal procedure if reliance for the development
of rules of law must be placed solely upon the often fortuitous circumstances of whether the issue can be effectively raised in litigation. And even as to issues which can be effectively raised, one
may doubt whether orderly development is possible in a system
where only one side can challenge the validity of an existing rule
by raising the issue anew in the appellate court.15
Doubt as to the responsibility of the legislature in the realm of
criminal procedure is also attributable to the fact that in many jurisdictions rules of court purport to deal with the subject.16 However, because
these rules of court deal only with procedure in court,17 they relate only
indirectly to problems at the police level. As in the case of statutes, existdividual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. CuM. L., C. & P.S. 171, 180
n.78 (1962).
14. BLACK, The Supreme Court and Democracy, in THE OCCASIONS OF JUSTICE
61, 66 (1963). See Kamisar, supra note 5, at 471-74.
15. Remington, Reform in State Criminal Procedure, Edward Douglass White
Lecture, Georgetown University Law Center, Nov. 13, 1963.
16. The trend, evidenced by Kentucky and Pennsylvania, appears to be toward
developing criminal procedure through rules of court. The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws some years ago decided that it was preferable that these developments occur by court rules. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMIssIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE

LAws, 1950 HANDBOOK 181.

17. E.g., FED. R. CRim. P. 1: "These rules govern the procedure in the courts
of the United States and before United States commissioners in all criminal proceedings ... ."; ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 1: "These rules govern the practice and procedure in the superior court in all criminal proceedings . ...
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ing court rules of criminal procedure either are not addressed to search
and seizure at all," or else are confined to the issuance of search warrants.'0
A second reason for the lack of legislative attention to problems
at the police level derives from the basic character of these law-making
bodies. Generally speaking, state legislatures do not themselves select the
subject matter on which they legislate. Rather, for the most part they
act only in response to the known desires of a substantial or at least
articulate segment of the public. 20 Although pressure groups do not always
obtain precisely what they want, the fact remains that legislative attention to a particular subject is unlikely in the absence of some organized nonlegislative group seeking legislation on that subject.
The police seldom have been law-seekers, and their infrequent activity in this role is not marked with success. Prior to the exclusionary rule,
"law enforcement groups preferred the ambiguity of seldom-litigated rules
and had no real incentive to take the risks involved in seeking legislative
action'" 21 Although the exclusionary rule should have provided the incentive, the police have expended most of their energies in criticizing
court-imposed restrictions rather than in seeking legislative clarification of
22
their authority
When the police do seek legislation clarifying or expanding their
authority, their efforts often suffer from lack of adequate preparation and
failure to marshal effective support. Partly because of the lack of legal
assistance, 23 proposed legislation originating with the police is likely to
be poorly drafted. These proposals usually originate within a particular
city department, and little or no effort is made to gather support from other
police agencies in the state or even other law enforcement agencies in
that locale. 2 Under these circumstances, the police find themselves over18. E.g., ARiz. R. CRIM. P. 1-367; PA. R. C0M. P. 1-2001.
19. E.g., Mo. R. CRIM. P. 21-37; ALASKA R. C inu. P. 52 A-1 to -37; DEL.
SuPE. Cr. (CRm.) 1-60.
20. See HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW-THE LAW MAKERS 62
(1950).
21. Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal Searclres, A Comment
on People v. Cahlan, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 565, 587 (1955).
22. The police are not alone in this regard. As Professor Packer recently

ointed out, most of the public debate has been addressed to "the wrong question:

Can the police operate under the rules that the courts are laying down for their

governance? A better question would be: To whom can we look for the establish-

ment of rules and sanctions to regulate the conduct of the police in a free society?
If we can look nowhere else but the courts it is silly to ask whether the courts are
doing an optimal job." Packer, supra note 9, at 19.
23. 'LaFave, supra note 1, at 418-19.

24. "Earlier this year, Superintendent Wilson sponsored in the legislature a

bill to authorize court-approved law enforcement wiretapping. Things went poorly
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whelmed in the legislative arena by the better organized forces opposing
the legislation-often the American Civil Liberties Union.25
Much of the proposed legislation on criminal procedure originates
with the organized bar. This includes both piecemeal additions to the procedure codes and, of course, complete recodifications of the law of criminal
procedure. 26 Because lawyers have assumed the responsibility for drafting
this legislation, the emphasis typically is upon those aspects of the criminal justice process with which lawyers are directly involved. The problems
of the police either are not dealt with at all or are dealt with in a superficial
manner. A few sentences are thought to suffice on the matter of search and
seizure, while paragraph after paragraph sets forth in great detail the rules
governing such matters as the selection of a jury. If some attempt is
made to deal with problems of the police, they ultimately may be deleted
27
in order not to jeopardize passage of other parts of the proposed code.
from the start. The bill, as originally introduced, was a shocking example of mushy
thought and inept draftsmanship. Into this breach, however, stepped the State's
Attorney of Cook County, Daniel Ward. He demanded, as the price of his support,
substantial modifications in the bill. Although the amendments proposed by Mr.
Ward did overcome some of the bill's inadequacies, this shoring up of the legislation was accomplished at the price of dramatizing a significant philosophical
schism between the State's Attorney and the Police Superintendent. In addition,
it pointed up a frightful lack of communication between two law enforcement
leaders who should be in continual contact on such vital issues.
"Into the fray at this point jumped the American Civil Liberties Union as well
as a number of editorial writers and news commentators; the legislation, they said,
posed a grave threat to civil liberties. What more was needed by those legislators
who already opposed the bill on less altruistic grounds? The outcome, of course,
is now history; the wiretap bill never got to first base.
o."....
This is just one of many examples which could be cited of too little law
enforcement leadership and imagination too late." Sowle, Organized Crime in Chkicago-Thre Untapped Forces of Change, 55 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 111, 112 (1964).
25. Sowle has characterized the ACLU as "a well-intentioned but sometimes
painfully naive collection of civil rights purists whose stands on most law enforcement questions seems to proceed from the basic premise that every policeman is a
potential Hitler or Castro." Id. at 112. While I would be somewhat more charitable toward this worthwhile organization, it is fair to say that some of the ACLU's
activities seem to be directed more at proving that police are inherently evil than
at seeking an objective understanding of the most difficult problems in criminal
justice administration. E.g., see SEcREr DETENTION BY THE CHICAGO POLICE, a Report
by the ACLU, Illinois Division (1959).
26. For example, the new ILLINOIS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE was prepared by the Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations' Joint Committee to Revise the Illinois Criminal Code.
27. The recent Illinois experience is illustrative. When some of the proposed
sections on police practices were publicly criticized by the Chicago Superintendent
of Police and by the ACLU (for quite different reasons, as might be expected), the
sponsoring committee decided to eliminate these sections from the proposal as forwarded to the legislature, rather than to include them either as written or revised
and jeopardize passage of the entire code. Bowman, The Illinois Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963, 52 ILL. B.J. 106, 108 (1963).
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When the drafting of a procedural code is undertaken, it is usually
assumed that the task can be accomplished satisfactorily without involving the police. This was the case, for example, with the recent Illinois enactment, where the first opportunity for police participation came only
after the printing and distribution of the tentative final draft, just a few
weeks before its introduction in the legislature. The Chicago Superintendent
of Police remarked, in presenting his views on the proposed legislation:
It is important that the committee recognize that my comments here today are in the nature of first impressions. The views
of the Chicago Police Department were not solicited in the drafting of the code. Until a week ago, our only knowledge of it was
gleaned from newspaper accounts. We have not had time, during
the past week, to study it as thoroughly as we would like, nor have
we had time to devise specific alternative wording for some of the
sections which are of greatest concern to us....
Effective administration and judicial implementation of a new
code of criminal procedure will be facilitated if there is available
careful explanation of the legislative purposes underlying the adoption of particular provisions. One of the real shortcomings in the
past has been the failure to articulate and analyze the problems of
the conscientious and able police officer who characteristically has
not been consulted in the drafting process. As a consequence, adequate understanding of the problems with which a law enforcement
2
agency must deal has been lacking.
To some extent, the failure of legislatures to deal with important
search and seizure issues also reflects the lack of an appropriate model
indicating the issues and alternative ways of dealing with them. The one
legislative model that has been utilized in some states is the American
Law Institute's Code of Criminal Procedure of 1930.29 With the exception of a section providing that "any person making a lawful arrest may
take from the person arrested all weapons which he may have about
his person,"'a the Code is silent on the subject of search and seizure. No
attention is given to the execution of search warrants, search incident to
arrest, search of vehicles, consent search, or similar problems. Although
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at
28. Wilson, Comments presented at the Conference on the Proposed Illinois
Code of Criminal Procedure, University of Illinois College of Law, Jan. 12, 1963.
29. The Code has been adopted in toto by one state and in part by twenty-two

others. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws,
HANDBOOK 247.

1949

30. ALI, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 32 (1930).
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one time proposed to update the Code, it was subsequently decided that
uniform rules of criminal procedure should be promulgated instead. This,
of course, changed the scope of the endeavor,31 and as with most criminal
procedure rules, the subject of search is not dealt with at all.32 The Uniform
Arrest Act offers no help as a model, for, notwithstanding the very close
connection between an arrest and a search incident thereto, it does not
purport to deal with the latter subject, except for the provision allowing
search for weapons of a person stopped for questioning whenever the officer
"has reasonable grounds to believe that he is in danger if the person possesses a dangerous weapon." 33 This neglect of police problems in general
and the vexing problems surrounding search and seizure in particular is in
marked contrast to other aspects of criminal justice administration, where
alternative models are now available to the legislatures.3 4
The oft-stated preference for legislative definition of norms of police
conduct rests upon two important considerations: (1) unlike courts, legislatures are not confined to any particular fact situations that may be
brought before it; and (2) unlike courts, legislatures have fact-finding
apparatus for gathering all relevant data necessary to the articulation of
sound norms.35 However, "our state legislatures, as intermittent, popularly-elected, nonexpert bodies, lacking in continuity, must have fundamental policy thinking done for them."386 Thus, if the legislatures are to
make a meaningful contribution, there must be available a body of information that is not confined to the matters dealt with by appellate courts
and that provides "the facts upon which an adequate set of rules needs
to be based."' 7 It is unfortunate but true thail to date legal scholarship
has failed to provide the necessary information for intelligent legislative
action regarding police practices.
Professor Cohen's recent observations concerning the state of legal
31. See

1950

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,

HANDBOOK

181.

32. The rules appear in

NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-

LAWS, 1952 HANDBOOK 307-56.
33. UNIFORM ARREST ACT § 3. The act is set forth in Warner, The Uniform

FORM STATE

Arrest Act, 28 U. VA. L. REv. 315, 343-47 (1942).
34. See, for example, Remington, supra note 15, concerning the

availability of

models relating to sentencing and correction.

35. See quotations supra notes 3 and 6, and Packer, supra note 9.

36. Cohen, Criminal Law Legislation and Legal Scholarship, 16 J.
253, 263 (1964).
37. Packer, supra note 9, at 21.
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research on the substantive criminal law are equally true-perhaps even
more true-as to research on criminal procedure:
The extreme disorganization of American criminal law legislation can probably be traced to a failure of legal scholarship to provide the stimulus of creative writing and legislative models. The
bulk of the writing done by legal scholars is concerned with problems reaching appellate courts. This reflects the ad hoc approach of
the case-oriented scholar and tends to overlook problem areas
not coming to the attention of appellate courts. An ad hoc legislative response along the lines of scholarly dissatisfaction with appellate decision-making is the typical result.8
Until recently, at least, law schools considered police problems only as
"the issues were reflected in appellate decisions," and as a result "legal
scholarship has not produced a basis for dealing with these questions at
the legislative level ....,39
Empirical research is vitally needed; legal scholars must "understand
police .. . practices and policies firsthand rather than wait in the comfort of the law library for those practices and policies to be reported in
appellate decisions. '40 Because of the lack of such research, "the revelations
of the Wickersham Commission . . . remain (much to our discredit) over

30 years later as good a source of information on law enforcement practices as we have."'41 And, considering the emphasis and research techniques
in that study, itis none too good a source of information.42 The same
can be said for the various other crime surveys that might qualify as
43
empirical research.
Because of this lack of helpful research identifying the basic policy
questions and their dimensions, and the failure of legislatures "to develop
procedures or agencies that would relieve it of detail and let it concentrate on the relatively few major issues of any session," 44 legislatures are
not likely to make a helpful contribution toward clarifying the norms of
police conduct even when procedural legislation is before them. An ex38. Cohen, supra note 36, at 263.
39. Remington, The Law, Tire Law School, and Criminal Justice Adminstration, 43 TEx. L. REv.275, 282 (1965).
40. Id. at 282-83.
41. Packer, supra note 9, at 18.
42. "An indication of the preoccupation with abuses [in the Wickersham Report] is seen in the fact that it was assumed that the most 'trustworthy accounts
of individual instances of unfairness were furnished in reported judicial decisions.'"
Remington, Criminal Justice Research, 51 J. CRnvi. L., C. & P.S. 7, 14 (1960).
43. For an excellent analysis of these surveys and their deficiencies, see Remington, supra note 42.
44. HuRsT, op. cit. supra note 20, at 66.
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perience in the enactment of the new Illinois code illustrates the difficulty.
The proposed code submitted to the legislature included a section
directing that "any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take
the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest or most
accessible judge. . . ."45 Although the "without unnecessary delay" language was used in the existing law,46 judicial interpretation of whether this
language contemplated delay for investigation in some cases was not consistent.47 In the legislature, one of the principal disputes over the proposed
code was whether "without unnecessary delay" should be retained or replaced by the word "forthwith." Yet, selection of either of these alternative
uses of language often viewed as synonymous by the courts in Illinois and
elsewhere,48 would hardly be a clear expression of legislative judgment concerning the basic issue involved. The "without unnecessary delay" language
ultimately was adopted, 4° but the police of the state have no greater insight
into the policy underlying the choice of this phrase than they had prior
to recodification. 50
3. The Future Role of the Legislatures
The legislatures, of course, never will play an exclusive role in defining the norms of police conduct. There is, however, some basis for the
belief that legislative bodies will be in a position to make a greater contribution in the years ahead.
One reason is that criminal law scholars are beginning to take an interest in empirical research on the current operation of the criminal justice
system. One significant study is the American Bar Foundation's Survey
45. ILLINOIS STATE AM CHICAGO BAR AssocIATIoNs' JOINT CoMmrtE TO
REVISE THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE, TENTATIVE FINAL DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED
ILLINOIS CODE OF CRIMINAL PRocEDuRE 1963, § 45-1(b).
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 660 (1961).

47. Compare the statement in People v. Jackson, 23 Ill.2d 274, 280, 178
N.E.2d 299, 302 (1961), that the statute "cannot mean... the police do not have

reasonable latitude to fully investigate a crime," with that in Fulford v. O'Connor,
3 Ill.2d 490, 500-01, 121 N.E.2d 767, 773 (1954), that "the fact that there is as
yet insufficient evidence to justify preferring charges against a criminal suspect is
not an excuse for detention, but is precisely the evil which the statute is aimed at
correcting."
48. E.g., People v. Jackson, supra note 47.
49. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1 (1965).
50. Of course, even if the legislature had been adequately appraised of the
fundamental issue involved, there is no guarantee that the statutory language
would have been any more helpful. This is because of "the legislators' tendencies
to seek out means of reconciliation and compromise-one of which is deliberate
vagueness-when conflicting proposals are presented." Remington & Rosenblum,

The CriminalLaw and The Legislative Process, 1960 U. ILL. L.F. 481, 482 n.1.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol30/iss4/2

12

LaFave: LaFave: Improving Police Performance

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

of the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States. Under a

Ford Foundation grant of 520,000 dollars, field researchers observed the
day-to-day operations of the police and other criminal justice agencies in
selected jurisdictions. For some years, the mass of raw data collected by
these field researchers has been subjected to sustained analysis. This analysis is now being made available in a series of five volumes, two of which
focus exclusively upon problems of the police. They provide an insight into
current issues of importance beyond that heretofore afforded by the appellate cases. 5'
The American Bar Foundation study does not purport to provide all
of the answers. Its objectives were limited, 52 it focused on but a few
states, and it suffered somewhat from the lack of prior practical experience
in the empirical study of legal institutions." Hopefully, however, the Survey will stimulate further efforts at uncovering the facts upon which sound
legislative policy should be based.
Secondly, some models from which to work will soon be available to
legislatures. The American Law Institute is sponsoring a Model Code of
Pre-Arraignnent Procedure, which is being drafted by Professor James

Vorenberg of Harvard with the assistance of Professors Bator and Fried
of Harvard and Dean Barrett of the University of California. They are
being aided by an advisory group made up of lawyers, judges and. law
enforcement officers. Among the matters the Model Code will deal with
are investigation of crime (including both stopping and questioning and
search and seizure), arrest, in-custody investigation, and treatment and
disposition of arrested persons.
In addition, the American Bar Association recently has undertaken
the preparation of Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice. This three-

year project, which will cost 750,000, dollars is being financed by the American Bar Association Endowment and by the Avalon and Vincent Astor
Foundations. The national committee, under the chairmanship of Chief
Judge J. Edward Lumbard of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, plans to recommend standards with the view to "improv51. One volume, recently published, is entitled Arrest: The Decision To Take
a Suspect into Custody. The other volume on police practices, soon to be published,
is called Detection of Crime, and deals with search and seizure, stopping and
questioning suspects, and entrapment.
52. See Remington, Editor's Foreword, in LAFAvE, ARREsT: THE DECISION TO
TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY XV-Xix (1965).

53. Hazard, The Research Program of the American Bar Foundation, 51

A.B.AJ. 539 (1965).
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ing the fairness, efficiency and effectiveness of criminal justice" on both
the state and federal level. The hope is that legislative bodies across the
country will consider these standards.- One of the six advisory committees is concerned with "The Police Function."5 5 Significantly, the membership of this committee, which will propose standards on search and seizure,
arrest, in-custody investigation, and related matters, includes representatives of the police5 6
Thus, there is some basis for optimism as to the future contributions
of legislation covering the powers of the police. At the same time, however,
the need to proceed with the greatest of care must be recognized. Professor
Packer has put it very well:
Experience with legislative reform in the criminal field has
been that it is difficult to accomplish and, once accomplished,
almost impossible to reopen. Any code of police practices that
emerges from current activity and that achieves widespread legislative acceptance (either because it is good or because it is better
than nothing) will in all likelihood set the pattern of governing
law for at least the next half-century. The control of police practices is by far the most poignant single issue that arises in the
oscillating maintenance of some kind of balance, or tension, between the demands of freedom and order that constitutes the
chief hallmark of the open society. The courts cannot do the job
alone; but the legislature cannot do it either without broader and
57
more reflective study than has been made.
C.

NORM-DEFINING BY THE APPELLATE COURTS

1. Extent of the Opportunity
Except for the rule-making power of appellate courts, which seldom
is conceived of as means for defining rules for police conduct, 8 the courts
54. Powell, An Urgent Need: More Effective Criminaw 1ustice, 51 A.B.A.J.

437, 440 (1965).

55. Judge Richard B. Austin of Chicago is chairman of this committee. My
colleague Charles H. Bowman is serving as reporter.
56. Included on the committee are Judge George Edwards, one-time Police
Commissioner of Detroit; H. Lynn Edwards, Inspector, Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Michael J. Murphy, until recently Police Commissioner of New York

City.
57. Packer, supra note 9, at 21.
58. See discussion supra p. 8. Probably the most significant limitation on the
police arising out of a rule of court is the requirement in FEn. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)
that the federal officers take arrested persons before a commissioner "without unnecessary delay." Yet, even here, it is not the rule itself that has had an impact,
but rather the Supreme Court's interpretation of this ambiguous language. See,
e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
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are powerless to take the initiative in declaring norms to govern the police.
An appellate court can speak only on the questions presented in the
cases that come before it: "our system serves the issues to this law-making
body only a tiny slice at a time, and leaves the choice of the particular
tiny slice to happenstance .... ."59
One of the principal virtues of the exclusionary rule is that it "assures
a great deal of judicial attention" to questions concerning police practices.0 0
A comparison of the development of the case law in states that have
long operated under the exclusionary rule with the development in the
twenty-five jurisdictions that since Mapp6 ' must "make up for lost time
'6 2
and begin their education in the biokinetics of law enforcement agencies,
makes this apparent. In the former states, because many defendants
have raised on appeal the legality of their arrest or search, the appellate courts frequently have had occasion to determine the boundaries of
lawful arrest and search.6s
59. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITIoN-DEcIDING APPEALS 263 (1960).
60. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Ride and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRnm.

L., C. & P.S. 255, 260 (1961).
61. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
321.

62. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE LJ.319,

63. "Our courts had not long to wait for the test cases that would compel
clarification of the exclusionary rule.... Some hundred cases arrived in the wake
of Cahan. Now that we look back on them with perspective, we find them a reasonably orderly constellation." Id. at 323.
To get some feeling for the range of problems that reach an appellate court
by virtue of the exclusionary rule, I have surveyed the work of the Illinois Supreme
Court over roughly the past ten years as reflected in the cases reported in 1 Ill.2d
through 30 Ill.2d. Excluding the cases that did not reach the substance of the allegations concerning the police conduct, such as those finding that the defendant
lacked standing to object, a total of fifty-seven cases were decided during this
period. (For most of this period the allocation of appellate jurisdiction between
the Illinois Supreme Court and the Appellate Court was such that the former received almost all cases involving questions of arrest, search and seizure. Also, except

for the last couple of years these cases could be appealed only by the defendant;

see text at note 85 infra. Of the 57 in the sample, 5 were prosecution appeals.)
Examination of the subject matter of these cases shows that the court received
an interesting variety of problems, although not corresponding to the variety of
problems the police actually faced. (See subsequent discussion in text for explanation of this.) Some questions reached the court repeatedly, although occasionally
there were significant differences in the factual situations so that the applicability
of prior holdings was in doubt. The most common issues were: whether the search
was by consent (8 cases); whether a controlled purchase of illicit goods justified
arrest and search (7 cases); whether information from an informant justified the
arrest and search (6 cases); whether the items were in plain view and thus not
discovered by a search (6 cases); whether the suspicious conduct of the defendant
justified his arrest (6 cases); whether the search warrant was issued on adequate
grounds (6 cases); whether the officer had actually observed an offense (5 cases);
whether the items were found in a proper search of premises incident to arrest
(5 cases). Some other questions only infrequently reached the court, such as:
whether search incident to a traffic violation arrest was proper (3 cases); whether a

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

15

19651

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 4 [1965], Art. 2

IMPROVING POLICE PERFORMANCE

By contrast, the appellate courts in states without the exclusionary
rule prior to Mapp received these issues only when an appeal was taken
from a tort action against a police officer. The many barriers to recovery"
have severely limited the number of appeals, and the defenses available are
such that an explicit statement of arrest and search norms is seldom required.6 5 Moreover, the civil suit context of the case may divert the appellate
court from the question of whether the police conduct was proper to that of
whether it is fair to subject the errant officer to personal liability. 8
Thus a single exclusionary rule case gives an appellate court a much
better opportunity to contribute to the definition of police standards than
does one tort case. More significant, however, is the fact that the exclusionary rule pushes a great many more cases to the appellate level.
This has the obvious advantage of providing the appellate tribunal with
a variety of factual situations with which to work, and also enhances the
quality of each judicial contribution. If a court receives but a few cases,
"the bits or slices or splinters which are cast up may be too fragmentary
description by a victim or witness was sufficient for defendant's arrest (2 cases);
whether minor deviations in the description in the search warrant invalidated the
warrant (2 cases); and whether a companion of a person properly arrested could
be searched (1 case).
It is also interesting to note the kinds of criminal conduct involved in these
57 cases: sale or possession of narcotics, 22 cases; gambling, 12 cases; burglary or
possession of burglarious tools, 12 cases; robbery, 4 cases; abortion, 2 cases; obscene
literature, 2 cases; assault, 1 case; murder, 1 case; and carrying concealed weapon,
1 case.
In view of the common complaint that the appellate courts are "handcuffing
the police," the court's disposition of these search and seizure and arrest issues
should be noted. Of the 52 defendant appeals, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the
trial judge's admission of the evidence in 40 cases, while in 12 cases it was held
that at least some of the evidence should have been excluded. Of the 5 prosecution
appeals, the court held that the trial judge erroneously suppressed the evidence in
all 5 cases.
64. LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DEcisloN To TAKE A SUSPECT INTo CUSTODY 41225 (1965); Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Riglts, 39
MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955).
65. For example, in a number of states conviction is said to be conclusive evidence that the police arrested on probable cause. Note, 27 NoTaE DAME LAW. 252
(1952); Foote, supra note 64, at 507-08. Even waiver of a preliminary hearing or
posting of bond is sometimes viewed as a bar to recovery. LAFAvE, op. cit. supra
note 64, at 418-20.
66. Thus, the Michigan Supreme Court has asserted that "a police officer
who acts in good faith in the line of duty should be protected even though overzealous in its discharge ....
If possible, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
an honest discharge of duty by peace officers, and the courts should not place them
in fear of responding in damages for the lawful and proper discharge of their duty."
Odinetz v. Budds, 315 Mich. 512, 517-18, 24 N.W.2d 193, 195 (1946). This position
has been criticized as failing to give substance to the criminal law philosophy that
it is better that a few escape punishment than to allow too permeating police surveillance. Foote, sapra note 64, at 502.
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to yield a proper picture or to allow the shaping and joining of complementary hubs and spokes and rims to form a doctrinal wheel. '' 67 But, if
the court receives "a related group of cases in a series," then "the court
will see more, learn more from the series; the court will begin to see
in the round rather than the flat, and to gain some understanding of the
whole in action." 8 The manner in which the law on arrest and search
and seizure has been developed by appellate courts in exclusionary rule
states certainly supports this thesis. 69
There are, however, some significant limitations on the opportunity
of the appellate courts to define standards for police conduct even with
the exclusionary rule. One is that until the recent case of Wong San v.
United States,'0 only physical evidence found incident to arrest could
be challenged.71 Therefore, only crimes involving physical evidence (e.g.
narcotics) were likely to raise the issue of the lawfulness of the arrest.
As a consequence, while there is no lack of appellate authority on the
question of when information from a narcotics informant is sufficient to
justify an arrest,72 there is little guidance on such questions as when, if
ever, an officer can arrest one or more than one member of a group of
suspects each with physical characteristics fitting the description given by
an eyewitness, 73 or when an officer can make a felony arrest on the basis
67. LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 59, at 263.
68. Ibid.
69. See note 63 supra for California's experience in this regard. This is also
supported by the Illinois survey, note 63 supra. For example, on two occasions,
while upholding a gambling arrest on the ground that the officer had observed the
offense, the court also asserted that the arrest and search could have been justified
by virtue of the traffic offense committed by the defendant. People v. Clark, 9
Il.2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820 (1956); People v. Berry, 17 Ill.2d 247, 161 N.E.2d 315
(1959). However, when the traffic offense was the only basis of the search, the
court then held that something more was needed before a search could be undertaken. People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960). Since Watkins, the
court has had two occasions to expand upon what else is necessary: People v. Mayo,
19 Ill.2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960), and People v. Zeravich, 30 Ill.2d 275, 195
N.E.2d 612 (1964).
70. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
71. Indeed, this is still close to being the case, in view of the limited interpretation most courts have given to Wong Sun. Rogers v. United States, 330 F.2d
535 (5th Cir. 1964); Hollingsworth v. United States, 321 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1963);
United States v. Burke, 215 F.Supp. 508 (D. Mass. 1963); Mefford v. State, 235
Md. 497, 201 A.2d 824 (1964); State v. Lavallee, 104 N.H. 443, 189 A.2d 475
(1963); State v. Jackson, 43 N.J. 148, 203 A.2d 1 (1964), are all cases not applying
Wong Sun to statements obtained later at the police station. Contra, United States
v. Sims, 231 F.Supp. 251 (D. Md. 1964); People v. Robinson, 13 N.Y.2d 296, 196
N.E.2d 261 (1963); State v. Mercurio, 194 A.2d 574 (R.I. 1963).
72. For example, see the results of the Illinois survey, in note 63 supra.
73. Thus, in the Illinois survey, note 63 supra, only two cases present the
arrest-on-a-description problem, and neither develops to any extent precisely how
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of suspicious conduct he observes. 74 These and similar questions confront
law enforcement officers just as frequently or perhaps more frequently than
75
the informant case.
A second limitation on the contribution of the appellate courts is
the fact that only the defendant can take an appeal from lower court rulings on police practices in an exclusionary rule context.7 6 Only a few legislatures77 have removed the prohibition on government appeal, which is said
to rest upon "historic principle" and "practicalities in the administration
of criminal justice,"'' T despite continuing criticism of the restriction."

This means that in most jurisdictions "the decisions of trial judges are
substantially immune from effective appellate supervision."8'

0

It is impos-

sible to obtain an appellate ruling on a particular police practice, no matter
how common it is or how important to the enforcement program it is
thought to be, unless one or more8 ' trial judges admit the evidence obtained incident to that practice and the defendant is ultimately convicted
and appeals.
specific the description must be. People v. Kalpack, 10 Ill.2d 411, 140 N.E.2d 726
(1957); People v. Flowers, 14 Ill.2d 406, 152 N.E.2d 838 (1958). In Flowers the
court noted that "other circumstances discovered by the police strengthened their
belief that defendant was the culprit," but these circumstances are not set forth
in the opinion.
74. Thus, in the Illinois survey, note 63 supra, only one case presents the
question of what can be done by the police when they observe suspicious conduct
not relating to any previously reported offense. People v. Faginkrantz, 21 Ill.2d
75, 171 N.E.2d 115 (1960).
75. See LAFAvE, op. cit. supra note 64, ch. 13.
76. "Quite generally, a ruling on the motion to suppress is not itself appealable because it is not regarded as a 'final order' or for some other reason. On the
other hand, if the motion is granted and the evidence suppressed, the prosecution
may have no case, with the result that the charge must be dismissed or the defendant acquitted. If the defendant is acquitted, the prosecution, of course, is barred
from access to the appellate court by appeal." Allen, The Exclusionary Rule in the
American Law of Search and Seizure, 52 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 246, 249 (1961).
77. Congress has granted the federal government the right to appeal from
orders granting pre-trial motions to suppress only in narcotics cases. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1404 (1965). A few state legislatures have enacted statutes allowing prosecution
appeal from pre-trial suppression orders, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 120-1 (1963),
superceded by a similar provision in ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 27(4); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC.

§ 518.

78. DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 129 (1962).
79. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Summary of the Findings and Recom-

mendations of the Subcommittee on Improvements in the Federal Criminal Code,

S. REP. No. 1478, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1958). See also Allen, supra note 76,
at 249.
80. Allen, supra note 76, at 249.
81. It is "or more" because in some jurisdictions defendants are able, by
various means, to get their motion to suppress ruled upon twice at the trial level.
See LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-Part
I: Current Police and Local Court Practices,30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 405 (1965).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol30/iss4/2

18

LaFave: LaFave: Improving Police Performance

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

Also of major importance here is the fact that when the cases to
be considered by the appellate courts are always supplied by individual
defendants and never by the state, the courts are not in a good position
to undertake an orderly development of legal doctrine. The fortuitous
circumstances under which defendant-supplied fact situations reach a court
will limit the opportunity of that court to "build" upon existing law.82
In contrast, if the state also can select some of these fact situations, this
"managed series of educational cases, judiciously selected"8' 3 would result
in a more systematic growth of significant legal principles. As Llewellyn pointed out, "a bit of management in bringing on a related group of
4s
cases in a series looks to be much more of a value than an ill.)Y
In 1961 the Illinois legislature passed a bill providing that "the
People may sue out interlocutory writs of error to review any order or
judgment quashing an arrest or search warrant or suppressing evidence
entered preliminary to trial." 5 The experience under this statute clearly
supports the view that appellate courts can make a more significant
contribution in defining norms for police conduct when appeal by the
state is possible. To date, prosecutors have taken five cases to the Illinois
Supreme Court "o and eight cases to the Illinois Appellate Court87 and
82. This is supported -by the Illinois survey, supra note 63. For example defendants may bring factual situations to the court notwithstanding the fact that
the court recently has upheld the identical practice without question. CoMpare
People v. Perroni, 14 Ill.2d 581, 153 N.E.2d 578 (1958), with People v. Shambley,
4 Ill.2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954).
Sometimes, however, the court will receive two or more cases at about the
same time which, through a careful process of fact distinguishing, does add substantially to the clarity of the law. This is so when the cases are in many respects
similar but one critical fact requires exclusion in one case and not in the other.
Compare People v. Burnett, 20 Ill.2d 624, 170 N.E.2d 546 (1960), with People
v. Van Scoyk, 20 Ill.2d 232, 170 N.E.2d 151 (1960); and compare People v. Mayo,
19 l.2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960), with People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 166

N.E.2d 433 (1960).
83. LLEWELLYN, Op. crt. supra note 59, at 262. He notes that on the federal
level "this planned-sequence business" is much more common, and is practiced not
only by the Solicitor General but also by non-governmental groups frequently in
a position to press litigation on related subject matter, such as the NAACP.
84. Id. at 263.
85. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 747 (1961) is the statute as amended by the bill.

The substance of this provision was carried over into the new

ILLINOIS CODE OF

ch. 38, § 120-1 (1963), now superceded
by ILL. Sup. Or. R. 27(4), which makes no change.
86. People v. Zeravich, 30 Ill.2d 275, 195 N.E.2d 612 (1964); People v. Walker, 30 Ill.2d 213, 195 N.E.2d 654 (1964); People v. York, 29 Ill.2d 68, 193 N.E.2d
773 (1963); People v. Williams, 27 Ill.2d 542, 190 N.E.2d 303 (1963); People v.
Montgomery, 27 Ill.2d 404, 189 N.E.2d 327 (1963). I have not included here People
v. Aiuppa, 29 Ill.2d 65, 193 N.E.2d 12 (1963), or People v. Nardone, 27 Ill.2d 44,
188 N.E.2d 28 (1963), which were transferred to the appellate court. See note
87 infra.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, ILL. REv. STAT.
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have obtained a reversal of the suppression order in every case.88 Included
in this small group of cases are some situations of real importance that
would not likely have reached the appellate level absent a right of prosecution appeal. For example, in one of the five cases reaching the Illinois
Supreme Court it was held that reliable hearsay could be used to obtain a
search warrant, 89 thereby overruling two prior cases that trial judges
probably would have continued to follow. Similarly, in another of these
cases the court held that a police officer need not disclose his identity
when he enters private premises posing as a customer of the illegal activity
occurring within.90 A prior Illinois Supreme Court case 9' gave some support to what until then had been the common practice of suppressing
evidence in such circumstances.9 2 Some of the cases brought before the
Illinois Appellate Court are equally significant. 98
Of course, the extent to which the right of prosecution appeal from
suppression of evidence broadens the opportunity of the appellate courts
to clarify arrest and- search norms will depend considerably upon the
criteria employed in selecting the cases to be appealed. The prosecutor,
87. People v. Hayden, 58 IllApp.2d 420, 208 N.E.2d 309 (1965); People v.
Hall, 56 I1l.App.2d 7, 204 N.E.2d 824 (1965); People v. Williams, 55 IllApp.2d 372,
204 N.E.2d 606 (1965); People v. DeFilippis, 54 IllApp.2d 137, 203 N.E.2d 627
(1965); People v. Panozzo, 48 Ill.App.2d 385, 199 N.E.2d 259 (1964); People v. Harvey, 48 Ill.App.2d 261, 199 N.E.2d 236 (1964); People v. Aiuppa, 48 Ill.App.2d 95,
198 N.E.2d 738 (1964); People v. Nardone, 43 IllApp.2d 409, 193 N.E.2d 617 (1963).
88. The fact that only thirteen cases have been appealed so far certainly
shows that appellate courts are not unduly burdened by granting the prosecution
the right to appeal in such cases. Of course, this does not mean that prosecutors
in the state have viewed only thirteen instances of suppression as improper. Because
of the limited resources of his office, the prosecutor obviously cannot appeal every
case having some basis for questioning the trial judge's decision that the police
conduct was improper.
89. People v. Williams, supra note 86.
90. People v. Walker, supra note 86.
91. People v. Dent, 371 Ill. 33, 19 N.E.2d 1020 (1939). Although the case
dealt with a different kind of situation, many trial judges thought the language
therein that an officer's entry of premises was "fraudulent" if obtained by consent
of a person who allowed entry "in ignorance of [the officer's] official character
and purposes" extended to the situation discussed above.
92. LaFave, supra note 81, at 436.
93. For example, in People v. Hall, sitpra note 87, the court held that items
of contraband not named in a search warrant and unrelated to the offense for
which the warrant was issued could be admitted into evidence if found during
the course of a lawful execution of the search warrant. In a hypothetical situation
presented at a seminar for Illinois trial judges in Chicago on September 18-19, 1964,
the judges all felt that the evidence should be excluded because it was not named
in the warrant. Some language in the new ILLINOIS CODE OF CRIMINAL PaocmURE
could be cited to support that view: "A defendant aggrieved by an unlawful search
and seizure may move the court for the return of property and to suppress as evidence anything so obtained on the ground that ... the evidence seized is not that
described in the warrant.. . ." ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-12 (1963).
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in selecting cases for appeal, is likely to choose the "big" cases-those in-

volving serious crimes and receiving the greatest publicity-although from
the police standpoint, the need for clarification of enforcement practices
used against relatively minor offenses, such as misdemeanor gambling, may
be much greater.0 4
2. Can the Courts Do the Job?
As Professor Packer has so ably pointed out, it is somewhat inappropriate to ask whether "the police can operate under the rules the courts
are laying down."0 5r The real question is not "whether the courts are
doing an optimal job," but rather whether it is possible to look elsewhere
for "the establishment of rules and sanctions to regulate the conduct of
the police in a free society." 96 Thus, in the present exploration of the
actual and potential contributions of the appellate courts in defining realistic norms for police conduct, it is necessary to keep in mind the very
basic point made earlier: to date, the legislatures have defaulted in their
obligation to make a real contribution in this area.
One of the major complaints of the "police-prosecution oriented critics
of the courts"' 7 is that law enforcement personnel, "those on the firing
line, " 9 are being subjected to controls by appellate judges who are far
removed from the day-to-day problems of police work. The "experts" or
"specialists," it is said, should not have their powers defined and limited
by the "amateurs" and "outsiders."09 The courts "are not competent to
make rules for police procedure," 10 declares Professor Waite; they deal
0
with each issue only as a "legal abstraction,"' '1 objects Superintendent
Wilson.
That our appellate judiciary are not specialists on matters of law
94. The Cook County State's Attorney (most of the appeals to date, see
notes 86 and 87 supra, have been from Chicago, as might be expected) has chosen
his cases reasonably well, however. People v. Walker, supra note 86, for example,
is a case of considerable importance to the Chicago police, although a prosecutor
would be unlikely to view it as significant.
95. Packer, Policing the Police, The New Republic, Sept. 4, 1965, p. 17, at 19.
96. Ibid.
97. Kamisar, On the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the
Courts, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 436 (1964).
98. ABA SEcnoN OF CRIMINAL LAW, 1955 PROCEEDINGs 58 (1956).
99. For citations to a number of assertions of this kind, with a most effective
rebuttal, see Kamisar, supra note 97, at 474-77.
100. Waite, Whose Rules? The Problem of Improper Police Methods, 48 A.B.A.J. 1057, 1058 (1962).
101. Wilson, Police Arrest Privileges in a Free Society: A Plea for Moderation,
51 J. CRIM. L., C.& P.S. 395, 396 (1960).
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enforcement, or indeed on any particular field, cannot be denied. But this
may be a virtue rather than a vice; Llewellyn viewed "our ancient institution of ultimate review by those complete nonspecialists, the general
Supreme Court, . . . as one of the wisest institutions man has thus far
managed to develop."1 02 The objection that "amateurs" are declaring police
norms is based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of our system of
government. Again Llewellyn:
[W]e have a legal system which entrusts its case-law-making
to a body who are specialists only in being unspecialized, in being
the official depositories of as much general and balanced but rather
uninformed horse sense as can be mustered. Such a body has as its
function to be instructed, case by case, by the experts in any
speciality, and then, by combination of its very nonexpertness in
the particular with its general and widely buttressed expert roundedness in many smatterings, to reach a judgment which adds balance not only, as has been argued so often and so hard, against
the passing flurries of public passion, but no less against the often
deep but too often jug-handled contributions of any technicians.103
These words of wisdom, although effectively disposing of the attack
upon our appellate courts as nonspecialists, do suggest a more appropriate
matter for concern. If the appellate court is to be "instructed ...by the
experts," then it is appropriate to ask whether the appellate process in
general or the current practice in appealing cases concerning police conduct in particular, is such that sufficient expert knowledge is made available to insure the declaration of sound and realistic police norms. The
real problem, as Judge Lumbard has suggested, may be that judges "are
being required to shape the law in this field with little or no guidance
from those who know most about the problems."10 4
Initially, it is important to keep in mind the fact that an appellate
court is not in a position to gather relevant information on its own
initiative.110 "It has no fact-finding facilities, except for its members' uncertain reliance on 'what everybody knows.' It cannot independently inform itself about the dimensions of the general law enforcement problem,
or identify and choose among the range of particularized solutions that
102. LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 59, at 333-34.
103. Id. at 263.

104. Lumbard, The Administration of Criminal Justice: Some Problems and

Their Resolution, 49 A.B.A.J. 840, 843 (1963).

105.

HURsT, THE GROWTH OF AMEaUcAN LAw-THE LAW MAKERS
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Thus, the court largely depends upon the litigants

If an appellate court is to be asked to render a decision intended to
have a prospective effect upon police policy and practice-and the exclusionary rule assumes this objective-then that court should have a
thorough familiarity with the policy and practice that it intends to affect.
This often is not the case. The "frozen record from below '107 presents
but one individual instance of arrest or search, and appellate counsel
do not attempt to compensate for this by showing the place of the individual
case in the over-all enforcement policy that is involved. The state prepares its appeal without any consultation with the police to learn
what significance the challenged practice has for them.
One consequence of this is that an appellate court that is concerned
about the general police practice involved in the case before it may have
to rely upon less than adequate data. For example, it is common for appellate courts even today to cite the Wickersltam Report on Lawlessness in
Law Enforcement'"8 as authority on the treatment of persons in custody
and for the proposition that abuses can be prevented only if arrested
persons are taken immediately before a magistrate. Not only is this report
over thirty years old, but it was primarily based upon appellate decisions.
Thus, the reliance placed upon this report for information as to current
practice is based on the doubtful assumption that the appellate opinions were
reliable evidence of the then current practices. Although appellate opinions
do indicate that certain police abuses occur, 10 9 this does not mean that
they constitute an adequate basis for assessing the legitimate needs of
law enforcement"1o
Another consequence is that cases often are fought out at the appellate level without an adequate characterization of the problem as seen
106. Packer, supra note 95, at 18.
107. LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 59, at 28.
108.

NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT No.

11 (1931).

109. In this sense, they are not a fair representation of police practices. An
Australian observer of our system has observed: "The cases which led to the examination into police practices seem to me to be cases in which the police excesses
have been indefensible. It is not the ordinary case that gets to the Supreme Court
of the United States. Rather, it is the exceptional case, the case involving the unusual deviation from normality which are represented in those decisions. This has
its effect. People think that because this has happened, it always happens." A Forum
on tLe Interrogationof the Accused, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 382, 429 (1964).
110. Remington, Criminal Justice Research, 51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 7, 14
(1960).
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from a law enforcement point of view. Again, this is no criticism of the
appellate judiciary, but rather of the counsel who frame the issues on appeal. The court receives the case with the "issue already drawn," and this
"tends powerfully both to focus and to limit discussion, thinking, and
lines of deciding.""'For example, a few years ago the Supreme Court of Illinois had before it a case involving a Chicago police officer who stopped and questioned
a person found in an alley under suspicious circumstances. 112 The case
raised a very vital question concerning the propriety of what the police
usually refer to as "field interrogation," a common and significant practice
in Chicago and elsewhere. Prior Illinois case law on this subject dealt only
with situations where the police put questions to persons sitting in parked
cars,1 3 and was ambiguous. Despite the importance of the issue to the
Chicago police, no one in the department was consulted on the appeal or
even knew that the case was being appealed. Thus it was not made apparent to the appellate court that the case put into question the entire
"field interrogation" policy. The result was that the court dealt with the
stopping and questioning issue only indirectly, leaving the police in doubt
as to the limitations on this common practice. It must be added that this
case is by no means unique. The police across the country have long
viewed "field interrogation" as a distinct law enforcement practice of
major significance," 4 yet when cases involving this practice reach the appellate courts they typically have been argued without directly confronting
the question of whether stopping and questioning or frisking incident thereto
is a proper law enforcement practice." 5
111. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TR"IoN-DECIDING APPEALS

29 (1960).

112. People v. Faginkrantz, 21 Ill.2d 75, 171 N.E.2d 5 (1961).
113. People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 47 N.E.2d 56 (1943); People v. Henneman,
367 Ill. 151, 10 N.E.2d 649 (1937).
114. See, e.g., BPusTow, FIELD INRROGATION (1958).
115. "An officer may stop and question a suspect under circumstances in which
the officer knows he will be in danger if the suspect is armed. Current police practice
under such circumstances is to frisk the suspect. If a gun is found, its admissibility
may be in issue in states which exclude evidence which is obtained illegally. The
basic issue is whether police have the right to frisk a suspect whom they have no
right to arrest. This is not the issue which is presented to the appellate court,
however. Typically, the prosecution will argue that an arrest was made and the
frisking was incidental to the arrest. The defense will argue that there were no
grounds for arrest. However the case is decided, the principal issue, the right to
frisk a suspect in the absence of an arrest, is avoided. The law and practice continue,
therefore, to fail to reflect each other's influence.
"Even the issue of the right to stop and question a suspect is typically avoided
with the result that this most common, most important law enforcement practice
is neither condemned nor sanctioned in most jurisdictions. For example, in a
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It would appear, then, that appellate courts, through no fault of
their own, are not in a position to do an optimal job because cases
come to them without adequate information or adequate conceptual framing of the issue as seen from a law enforcement viewpoint. Now consider
the product of the appellate court's labors-appellate opinions. What is it
that we expect from these opinions? Undeniably, "in our law the opinion has
... a central forward-looking function which reaches far beyond the cause in
hand: the opinion has as one if not its major office to show how like cases
are properly to be decided in the future.""" This rings particularly true
in the exclusionary rule cases, for a court that suppresses evidence because
of police misbehavior certainly has an obligation to contribute to the body
of law informing the police of the legal limitations upon their authority.
What Justice Clark has said of the Supreme Court is equally applicable
to all appellate courts:
Every moment of every day, somewhere in the United States,
a law enforcement officer is faced with the problem of search and
seizure. He is anxious to obey the rules that circumscribe his conduct in this field. It is the duty of this Court to lay down those
rules with such clarity and understanding that he may be able to
7
follow them.1
Here the courts face a dilemma. When an appellate court sets forth a
"rule" which transcends the facts of the individual case, it becomes involved
in a business which it is least equipped to handle; yet when an appellate court
sets forth a "rule" that is cautiously confined to the facts of the case before
it, it affords minimal guidance to the police. Professor Packer, referring to
the Supreme Court, speaks to the first point:
The Court moves with greatest assurance when it looks at a
particular injustice which it should right. It moves with unease
when it tries to frame a general standard for police conduct. It is

one thing to say: This defendant's confession was illegally coerced
recent case in the United States Supreme Court the majority of the Court held
that the issue of the right to stop and question is identical with the issue of the
right to take a person into custody. While the law might properly take the position
that there is no right to stop and question a suspect unless adequate grounds for
arrest exist, this conclusion ought not be based upon the uncritical assumption
that the questions lack important differences." Remington, The Law Relating to
"On the Street" Detention, Questioning and Frisking of Suspected Persons and
Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 386, 386-87 (1960).
116. LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 111, at 28.
117. Clark, J., dissenting in Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 622
(1961).
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because he was illiterate, unadvised of his rights, held incommunicado, subjected to threats, beaten, or whatever. It is quite another to say: No person who is arrested may be questioned by the
police until he has been advised of his right to remain silent and
to have the assistance of a lawyer if he wants to. And yet it is this
second kind of statement (although not, as yet, this particular one)
to which the Court has been resorting with increasing frequency
in the last few years.""'
On the other hand, a we-hold-on-these-facts opinion may leave the
police at a loss as to what they are expected to do. An excellent example
is Escobedo v. Illinois,'" which announced a "new" exclusionary rule,

applicable in instances of denial of counsel. After leveling a broadside at
the practice of obtaining confessions generally, the Court states its holding:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun
to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into
police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations
that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect
has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his
lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his
absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has
been denied 'the Assistance of Counsel' ...

and that no statement

elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against
1
him at a criminal trial.

20

Lawyers, of course, will recognize this as an effort to limit the scope of
the decision to the particular facts, hardly inappropriate as the Court
begins moving into this new and sensitive area.1 2' However, the consequence
is that, while the police know that a voluntary confession may be suppressed, they have little basis for translating the requirements of Escobedo

118. Packer, supra note 95, at 18.
119. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
120. Id. at 490-91.
121. "What our study shows ... is (1) that a court ought always to be slow
in -unchartedterritory, and, in such territory, ought to be narrow, again and again,
in any ground for decision. Until the territory has been reasonably explored. But
what our study shows is (2) that once there is a clearisk light, a court should make
effort to state an ever broader line for guidance. And (3) so long as each line is
promptly and overtly checked up and checked on and at need rephrased on each
subsequent occasion of new illumination, such informed questing after broader lines
is of the essence of good appellate judging." LLEWELLYN, op. cit. supra note 110
at 389.
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into a revised interrogation practice that will be both effective and in conformity with the requirements of the Constitution.
Apart from this dilemma, what can be said about appellate opinions?
The concern here is not with the quality of appellate opinions in general,
about which much has been written,22 but rather with the utility of
opinions on arrest, search and seizure as guides to future police conduct.
There are a number of opinions that are less than helpful because they
fail to grapple with the facts upon which the police officer acted. For
example, if the issue before the court is whether a lawful arrest was made,
the court may proceed as follows: (1) an arrest can be made on reasonable
grounds to believe; (2) this means that mere suspicion is not enough;
(3) on the other hand, this means that evidence sufficient to convict is
not required; (4) we think the officer in this case had reasonable grounds.
Without a careful analysis of the facts upon which the officer in that case
acted, such an opinion will be of little assistance to the police, who typically
must act on the basis of a cluster of facts directing them toward a particular suspect. However, as appellate courts gain added experience in
thrashing out problems of police conduct, this kind of summary treatment
23
is disappearing.1
3. The Future Role of the Appellate Courts
There is no doubt that appellate courts will continue to play a part
in defining the norms to control police conduct. However, whether the
courts will make a greater contribution in the future may depend in large
measure upon whether they receive the benefit of effective legislative action.
Judge Lumbard's words are worth repeating: "While the courts must play
their part, the Bar should not expect judges to discover policy and make
rules in default of legislative findings and statutes which, to be effective,
122. E.g., 1 WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 8a (3d ed. 1940); Smith, The Current Opinions of the Arkansas Supreme Court-A Study in Craftsmanship, 1 ARK. L. Rxv.
89 (1947).
123. Thus, I cannot point to any case in my Illinois survey, supra note 63,
which illustrates this situation, although many of the earlier Illinois cases might
be criticized on this ground. Indeed, I am impressed with the care given to assessment of the weight of the various facts known by the police prior to arrest. For
example, see People v. Peak, 29 Ill.2d 343, 194 N.E.2d 322 (1963).
Occasionally, however, even the recent cases in my survey are not as explicit
as one might hope. It is somewhat annoying, for example, when the court upholds
an arrest on a general description by observing that "other circumstances discovered
by the police strengthened their belief that defendant was the culprit," but fails to
even recite what these circumstances were. People v. Flowers, 14 Ill.2d 406, 152
N.E.2d 838 (1958).
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must be based on accumulated experience and an appraisal of competing
interests.

124

For one thing, prior legislative activity can aid substantially in
sharpening an appellate court's appreciation of the conceptual framework within which a particular case is to be viewed. Illustrative is the
impact of New York's "stop-and-frisk" law 2 5 upon the approach of the
appellate courts in that state to that particular issue.126 Secondly, if the
legislatures use their fact-finding capabilities to establish broad policies, then the movement of the courts "to ever-increasing generality of
statement ' '12l may be halted. The courts can then return to the task
of building, bit by bit, additional guidelines for the police in the context
of specific factual situations. This, as Justice Brennan has observed, "is
a particular problem with which appellate courts must wrestle.'

D.

128

TRAINING THE POLICE

1. Current Status of Law Enforcement Training
Even if the appellate courts and the legislatures optimally perform their
respective norm-defining functions, this alone is no guarantee of improved
police service. Developments in the law of arrest and search are "likely
to be 'wasted' on indifferent, insensitive police departments, more apt to
stir thought and action when quality and training are high."'129 Thus, it
has been said that, of the many critical problems in the administration
of criminal justice today:

124. Lumbard, supra note 104, at 846.
125. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180(a).
126. Thus, in People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d
458 (1964), the court stated and decided the case on the issue of when, if ever,
police officers have a right to stop and question and incidentally thereto frisk per-

sons engaging in suspicious conduct. Although the court does not undertake to
interpret the new statute or apply it to the case, inasmuch as the conduct in question took place prior to the effective date of the statute, the court does use the
statute in characterizing the nature of the issue before it. The court thereby avoided
the inadequate analysis found in the prior New York cases, e.g., People v. Esposito,
118 Misc. 867, 194 N.Y.S. 326 (1922), which had fit the general pattern described
in note 115 supra. The point is not that in Rivera, unlike the prior cases, the court
upheld the police action; rather, it is that the court recognized "field interrogation"
as a distinct law enforcement practice deserving of independent analysis.
127. Packer, supra note 95, at 18.
128. ABA SEcrION OF CRIMINAL LAW, 1962 PROCLEDINGs 40 (1963).
129. Kamisar, Some Reflections on Criticizing the Courts and "Policing the
Police," 53 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 453, 458 (1962).
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First comes the need for trained police. Police officers must
be better instructed about their duties and powers to investigate
and about the individual rights which they must respect. They
must know when they may question, when they may detain, when
they may arrest, when they must arraign, under what circumstances statements and confessions may be obtained, how searches
may be made legally, and, generally, what means of obtaining
evidence are proper. Brains and know-how must take the place of
brawn and blunder, or a lengthy investigation will go for naught.' 30
It is clear that the exclusionary rule has served as a stimulus to
police training on the legal requirements of search and arrest. Justice
Murphy's limited survey of training efforts in exclusionary rule and non1*
exclusionary rule states, reported in his dissent to Wolf v. Colorado,"
tended to support this conclusion.1 32 Since that time, additional evidence
has been accumulated. California's adoption of the exclusionary rule
in the Calhn case resulted in greater efforts at training the law enforcement officers of that state.1 33 The impact of Mapp was reflected by
much improved training on search and seizure in jurisdictions that there3
tofore had been in the nonexclusionary rule category, such as Minnesota
and Pennsylvania.'" Moreover, since Mapp the FBI has greatly intensified
its efforts in training state and local officers on the requirements of the
30
Fourth Amendment.'
At the same time, however, it must be recognized that the existence
of the exclusionary rule is no guarantee of good police training on the law
of arrest and search. Indeed, some of the states that have long adhered
130. Lumbard, The Administration of Criminal Justice: Some Problems and
Their Resolution, 49 A.B.A.J. 840, 841 (1963).
131. 338 U.S. 25, 44-46 (1949).
132. Justice Murphy's conclusions were based upon the twenty-six replies received to inquiries to the police departments in the thirty-eight largest cities in
the United States. He concluded that, generally speaking, it appeared that the extent and quality of training on search and seizure was much higher in exclusionary
rule states. He pointed out Denver as one apparent exception, but more recently
it has been established that Denver fit that general pattern-the exclusionary rule
not being in effect there, training on the law of search was not given. Weinstein,
Local Responsibility for Improvement of Search and Seizure Practices, 34 RocKY
MT. L. REv. 150, 159 (1962).
133. Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 171, 179 (1962).
134. Id. at 181.
135. Spector, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora'sProblems for the Prosecutor,111 U. PA.
L. REv. 4, 5 (1962).
136. Edwards, Law Enforcement Traimng -n the United States, 3 Am. CRiM.
L.Q. 89, 90 (1965).
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to the exclusionary rule are among the most backward in this regard81a
It has been some four years since Mapp required exclusion in all jurisdictions, yet training remains very spotty in both quantity and quality.
It is fair to say that presently no state in the country can serve as an
appropriate model of what needs to be done.
Training first becomes important as new men are added to the police
ranks. This is because "police departments seldom employ policemen as
such. They employ the best available men and then try to make policemen
out of them. . . This is a burden borne by no other professional discipline."138 Academic study in preparation for a career of police service is
the exception rather than the rule; presently, thirty-eight states are without
a college or university that provides facilities for training prospective
policemen.'- 9 Although in the last few years more and more states have
enacted legislation to provide centers for training police recruits, 140 New
York is the only state with a mandatory state-wide police recruit training
program.1 4 . Elsewhere the quantity and quality of preservice training is
determined by each department. Much of this training is "of the 'cram'
flavor and is designed almost solely to get the student on the force, that is,
to squeeze him through the civil service barrier.' ' 42 Clearly, much remains
to be done to adequately prepare aspirants to the police profession. 4
In-service training is also of critical importance. It serves not only
as a "refresher," but also-and this is particularly true with search and
seizure-to inform and instruct the police on recent developments. The
FBI has played a significant role here. In the seventy-four sessions of
its National Academy, established in 1935, 4,546 specially selected law
enforcement officers from the state and local level have received training.'"
In addition, the Bureau has provided instructors for local law enforcement
training programs; in a recent year, the FBI participated in 4,163 of these
4
programs, reaching 117,275 local officers.1 1
137. Waite, Judges and the Crime Burden, 54 Micr. L. REv. 169, 104 n.77
(1955).
138. Gourely, State Standards for Local Police Recruitment and Training, 53
J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 522, 524-25 (1962).
139. Parker, The Police Service-A Key to Community Quality, 55 J. CaiM.
L., C. & P.S. 273, 279 (1964).
140. Edwards, supra note 136, at 91-92.
141. Lumbard, supra note 130, at 841.
142. Clift, Police Training, 291 Annals 113 (1954).
143. Brereton, The Importance of Training and Education in the Professionalization of Law Enforcement, 52 J. GRim. L., C. & P.S. 111 (1961), traces the developments in preservice training and notes what remains to be done.
144. Edwards, supra note 136, at 89.
145. Id. at 90.
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There is, of course, only so much that the FBI can do toward elevating
the training of the nearly half million police in the country. The Bureau
can aid in in-service training only if a program is initiated at the local
level, and today there is a total absence of such training in many agencies. 146
Existing training programs vary considerably in quality, particularly in
the area of arrest and search law.
Assuming that a state supreme court were to decide a case of major
importance on the law of arrest or search, it would be hoped that word of the
decision would reach the state's various police agencies, who then would instruct their front-line personnel as to the significance of the case for future
enforcement activities. This ideal is far from being realized. Established
means of communicating important legal developments to police agencies
are lacking. Prosecuting attorneys seldom make a systematic effort to
keep the police advised, and even if the printed decisions are forwarded
to the law enforcement agency there may be no effort to disseminate this
information to personnel at the operational level.147 Thus, even if a state
appellate court renders a very significant decision on arrest or search, it is
unlikely that more than a small minority of the police in that jurisdiction
will ever have the case brought to their attention, and those who do
receive word of the decision often will not receive clear instructions on
what changes in law enforcement policy or practice it requires.1 48

2. The Limiting Factors
"The law enforcement officer," it is said, "lives in a practical world
and he is entitled to plain answers to plain questions." 149 Currently, however,
he receives no answers, wrong answers, or answers that are far from
plain on important questions of arrest and search. Because this must be
changed before the price exacted by the exclusionary rule pays off in
terms of better police performance, it is important to understand the many
factors that contribute to the present situation.

146. Clift, supra note 142, at 115.
147. For example, in one large police department it was the practice until a
few years ago for a clerk in the commissioner's office promptly to file away appellate opinions the county prosecutor sent to the police department.
148. As noted earlier, the case itself may not make it apparent precisely what
these changes should be. See text at note 121 supra.
149. Edwards, supra note 136, at 96.
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a. Fragmentized, Decentralized Law Enforcement

Decentralization and fragmentation 'tare the most striking characteristics of American police patterns, since no other part of the world has
carried local autonomy in police management to such extreme lengths."'15
Foreign observers of our system are always startled by this fact, and
frequently have commented on the relatively difficult task of developing
proper police methods we have as a result of our local autonomy.' 5'
In this country there are roughly 400,000 persons employed in police
protection on the national, state, and local level."'2 Including those who
exercise limited police authority or part-time authority, the number approaches a million. 53 These people work in some 45,000 separate and
distinct law enforcement agencies, 54 each having limited geographical and
subject matter enforcement responsibilities. For example, there are 350
municipal, county, and state police forces operating within a fifty mile
radius of the city of Chicago. 155 It is apparent that these circumstances
make police training extremely difficult; much more difficult than, say,
in England, where centralizing factors are such that the Home Secretary
possesses considerable authority over all the 120 different forces with their
roughly 60,000 policemen, one third of whom are in one agency, the Metropolitan Police Force. 56
It may be, as is often stated, that the decentralized character of
American police service is desirable and that a consolidation of police
service would be dangerous. 5 7 Yet, there is clearly room for co-operative
THE UNITEI STATES 316 (rev. ed. 1949).
151. E.g., see the comments of an Australian observer in A Forum on the Interrogation of the Accused, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 382, 429 (1964).
152. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRAcT OF THE UNITED STATES
435 (1964). Other recent estimates have been somewhat lower, such as 200,000,
TREBACH, THE RATIONING OF JUSTICE 56 (1964), or 300,000, Misner, Mobility and
the Establishment of a Career System in Police Personnel Administration, 54 J.
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 529, 531 (1963).
153. Germann, Hurdles to Professional Police Competence: VII. Confusion
About Police and Civil Liberties, 8 Police 33, 34 (Sept.-Oct. 1963).
154. Ibid. "Small police departments are the rule-not the exception. In 1959,
the average size of police departments reporting to the Department of Justice was
47 personnel. In 1952, Earle W. Garret reported that at least 90 per cent of the
nation's police departments employed less than 24 personnel each. In a more recent
study, California's Attorney General reported that 63 per cent of the state's municipalities employed less than 20 sworn police personnel." Misner, supra note 152.
155. Peterson, Issues and Problems in MetropolitanArea Police Services, 48 J.
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 127 (1957).
156. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 17-19 (1958).
157. E.g., Hoover, The Basis of Sound Law Enforcement, 291 Annals 39, 40-42
(1954).

150. SMITH, POLICE SYSTEMs IN
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efforts in developing a higher caliber of police training. Some co-operation
now exists, as with the operation of zone training programs,' 58 but for
the most part each of the 45,000 agencies is free to determine the level
and nature of the training to be given their own personnel.
Nor is there any co-operative effort to keep informed on current
developments in the law of arrest and search; for the most part, each
agency must establish its own channels of communication. With most of
the developments being of state-wide importance, it would seem practical
to develop a communication system for disseminating the critical information to all law enforcement agencies in the state. The recent action of
the New York State Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials in
distributing a bulletin with guidelines on the new "no-knock" and "stopand-frisk" laws to every New York enforcement agency illustrates what
could be done. 59
b. Competing Demands for Local Resources
Training costs money, and with our decentralized police service the
local government unit usually must assume this burden.1 60 Because of the
limited taxing power of state and local governments and the general lack
of revenue reform, the necessary funds are not available. Moreover, the
local officials who are responsible for the allocation of tax revenues seldom
perceive the needs of the local police agency. As Professor Goldstein has
pointed out:
City administrators view expenditures for police operations
much in the same manner as they view expenditures for the
operation of a fire department-to finance men and equipment
prepared to perform their assigned job. There is a somewhat mechanical concept of policemen directing traffic; aiding people in
distress; and responding hurriedly to calls for assistance. Few city
administrators view the police as engaged in the most delicate
function of enforcing a standard of conduct upon a community;
of operating within the confines of carefully constructed grants of
authority; of dealing with people under trying circumstances. 61
158. See INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS ASS'N, MUNICIPAL POLICE ADMINIs180-181 (5th ed. 1961).
159. The Council prepared 25,000 copies of this 2,000 word bulletin and saw
to its distribution throughout the state. N.Y. Times, June 2, 1964, p. 33, col. 1.
160. Some of the existing state programs do provide some forms of financial assistance to local governments, however. Brereton, supra note 143.
161. Goldstein, Research and Training Needs in Police Administration, a paper
prepared for the Center for Programs in Government Administration, Univ. of
Wisc., Oct. 22, 1962, p. 1.
TrATION
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One difficult question is how the limited funds made available for
law enforcement can best be used. Again there are competing demands.
Goldstein, with his wealth of practical experience in police-local government
problems, states the dilemma very well:
Two strong forces presently exert themselves upon the municipal administrator who is concerned with the use of police manpower. On the one hand he is faced with a constantly increasing
crime rate, growing problems in traffic control and enforcement,
and new regulations and laws to enforce-all of which point to an
apparent need for more manpower. On the other hand he is faced
with a demand for improving the quality of law enforcement, for
upgrading standards of recruitment and training, and for improving
police salaries. Since both forces require the expenditure of funds,
they compete against each other for whatever resources the community is able to devote to police service.
Of the competing pressures, that-which calls for added manpower has the greatest public appeal. Unaware of the inner workings and problems of law enforcement, the public tends to realize
a sense of comfort and reassurance on knowing that more policemen will be on duty--somewhere-in the community. In contrast,
improved training or increased salaries have no similar appeal.
Given both of these, the public envisages the same people in the
same number performing the same work. They see little direct
benefit from such improvements and demonstrate a lack of awareness of the long-range benefits such improvements are designed
62
to accomplish.1
It is understandable, perhaps, that police administrators respond to
this demand for more police over better police. It is discouraging, however,
,to find them suffering from the same blind spots on the specific question
of how best to meet the demands the exclusionary rule has made upon
the police. One suspects that the comment of one police official that because
of the Map-p decision "a possible doubling of Police Department personnel
might be necessary to do the same job we're doing now " e" is not atypical.
c. Competing Demands on Available Training Time
In this complicated society of the 1960's, we make some very heavy
demands of the policeman. The police officer is expected to be able to handle
162. Goldstein, Guidelines for Effective Use of Police Manpower, 45 PuBLic
MANAGEMENT 218 (1963).

163. This statement was attributed to the Denver Manager of Safety. Weinstein,
supra note 132, at 150 n.2.
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a great variety of delicate problems in human relations. At the same time,
we require that he have an understanding of the many technical aspects
of crime detection and law enforcement, the statutes he is to enforce, and
the legal limitations on his authority. Moreover, he must be prepared to
respond quickly in emergencies.
One police administrator has asserted that "the expanding police
technology . . .has increased at such a phenomenal rate that the ideal
of complete competency has become a myth. No single officer can
effectively perform in the diverse and highly technical fields which
police science has created."'0 4 It is debatable whether the problem has
as yet reached these proportions, but clearly it is extremely difficult to provide adequate preservice and in-service training to this jack-of-all trades, or,
if you will, jack-of-all emergencies, particularly within the limited resources
available.
Although the particular concern here is with police training on arrest
and search, one consequence of the situation described above is that
those responsible for training the police cannot think solely in these terms.
Rather, they must consider how much time can be given to the total
training program, and then make some hard choices between subjects
competing for the available time. The result is that training on the law
of arrest and search typically constitutes a relatively small part of the
total program.
Consider, for example, the operation of the Chicago Police Department
Recruit Training School, one of the most ambitious training programs
in the country. This program provides a total of 455 hours of training
and instruction, covering 130 different subjects. The subject given the
most hours (eighty in all) is "Criminal Law Administration," which actually
includes both the substantive and procedural criminal law. Ten of these
hours are devoted to "Laws of Arrest, Search, and Seizure." Thus, slightly
over 2 per cent of the total training program is all that is devoted to the
subject of the legal limitations on arrest and search.', 5
It is questionable whether the law of arrest and search can be taught
adequately within this limited time. Yet, it is not apparent that this allocation of available time is necessarily wrong, considering all that must
164. Parker, The Police Challenge in Our Great Cities, 291 Annals 5, 10 (1954).
165. This allocation is typical of above average quality current training programs. See, for example, the California State Department of Education curriculum
for recruit training. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS Ass'N, MUNICIPAL POLICE ADMINISTRATION 183-84 (5th ed. 1961).
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be accomplished during the recruit training program. The entire curriculum of the Chicago recruit training program reflects the complexity of
the police officer's job; consider this sample of subjects covered: handling
mentally disturbed; election duties; basic patrol; principles of report writing; emergency obstetrics; crime scene procedure; police ethics; firearms practice; crowd control; basic psychology; basic sociology; human relations;
communications systems and procedures."",
The same situation prevails as to in-service training. Even in departments having an extensive program, which is the exception rather than
the rule, the great variety of subject matter to be taught considerably
limits the time available for refresher training on the law of arrest and
r
search.M
The necessary breadth of these programs also raises the question of
how much knowledge of arrest and search trainees actually absorb. As one
expert on police training has observed:
[Wihile the curriculum and method of training in many recruit
schools expose the student to a vast amount of knowledge, it also
often serves utterly to confuse him ...
In-service training in many police departments is much more
like that of recruit training.... When central training is conducted,
the variety of subjects is often more than the mind can absorb.118
d. Lack of Effective Training Materials
The state of police literature generally leaves much to be desired,
for it is not of good quality and for the most part lacks depth.16s This is
particularly true with respect to the literature on arrest and search; the
quality of writing available for police on legal subjects is, as a whole,
lower than that on technical subjects, such as fingerprinting or basic
patrol techniques. This is most unfortunate, because the published ma166. The curriculum of the Chicago Police Department Recruit Training School
is set out in detail in WILSON, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 166-71 (2d ed. 1963).
167. I would again cite the Chicago Police Department as an agency that has
done much more than most departments in this regard. A major part of the efforts
of the department are reflected in their weekly Training Bulletin, a four-page document distributed to each member of the force and used for roll call instruction. I
have perused the Bulletin for a period of nearly five years (vol. I, no. 1, dated Nov.
14, 1960, through vol. VI, no. 29, dated July 19, 1965), and would estimate that
the subject matter allocation is roughly the same as that for the recruit training
program.
168. Clift, supra note 142, at 115.
169. Gabard & Gabard, Tke Present Status of Police Literature, 48 J. Carim.
L., C. & P.S. 664 (1958).
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terials often are used to provide the basis for department training programs,170 and often are purchased and studied by individual officers desiring to improve themselves. 1 7 Some of the common types of police literature on arrest or search follow:
(1) The Scissors-and-Pante-PotType. Some of the material prepared
for police consumption consists of nothing more than a collection of
quotations from statutes or cases from the jurisdiction, with absolutely
no attempt at analysis. Illustrative is a sixty-five page pocket-size pamphlet entitled Arrests, Searches and Seizures, which the Illinois Attorney
2
The quotations provide
General supplies to the police of that stateYV
the police with such fascinating information as the fact that "the word
(arrest) is derived from the French, arreter,"' 73 but accomplish little beyond this. As noted earlier, the need of the police is not merely to receive
the appellate cases--or, as here, bits and pieces from them. They need an
understanding of the law that provides some guide for their conduct
in the great variety of situations that will confront them. Because of the
total lack of analysis in these scissors-and-paste-pot materials, the police
are unable to develop a situation-sense sufficient to cope with specific fact
17
patterns. ,

(2) Thse General-Statemnt-for-All-JurisdictionsType. There are, of
course, some general similarities between the laws of arrest and search
of the several states. Law enforcement officers in all jurisdictions should know
the limitations imposed on the states by the United States Supreme Court.
Yet, for the most part, any detailed understanding of the law of arrest
and search requires a careful synthesis of the statutes and cases in a particular state. A book that purports to be usable in all jurisdictions, as many of
170. This is the practice in the District of Columbia, for example. MERaoPoLID. C., REPORT TO BOARn OF COMMISSIONERS, D. C.,

TAN POLICE DEP'T, WASHINGTON,

IN RE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF COMMISSIONERS'COMMITTEE

ARRESTS FOR INVESTIGATION, Sept.

ON POLICE

5, 1962, p. 7.

171. In talking with police officers, I have found it interesting to learn how
eager they are for helpful information on how to make proper arrests and searches.
Many of them have purchased the commercially produced publications, advertised
in police periodicals, at considerable expense in the hope of improving their effectiveness.

172. ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL,

ARRESTs, SEARCHES AND SEIZUtEs (rev. ed.

1961).
173. Id. at 2.
174. For example, the Illinois materials, note 172 supra, are replete with general
statements to the effect that an arrest must be on reasonable grounds, that mere
suspicion is not enough, that something less than evidence sufficient for conviction
is needed, etc. The materials do not speak to what is to be done in specific recurring
situations, such as when information is received from an informant.
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them do,175 actually will be of very limited utility in any one state. This is a
common failing of the commercially produced materials directed to the police;17 6 "the need to sell to a national market results in generalities not of
177
practical use anywhere."
(3) The Law-of-One-Jiuisdicton Type Sold Nationally. A number
of books are produced commercially for police consumption and are
advertised nationally even though the law of arrest and search dealt with
therein is limited primarily or exclusively to one jurisdiction. As one
expert on police training suggests, this may be attributable to the fact
"that they are written by persons who don't realize the extent of variation
from the law of their own jurisdiction. "178 More likely, however, these
books represent an attempt to sell to a national market material originally
prepared for use in but one jurisdiction.179 Thus, in Alexander, The Law
of Arrest, the author observes that his first effort was to prepare a manual
for New York police, but that it has been "enlarged so as to be equally
useful everywhere."'1s0 The citations, however, are primarily to New York

law.
With the bulk of the materials prepared for police consumption fitting
into one of these three categories, most of the written guidance for police
on arrest and search is either extremely general or downright misleading.
There is a clear need for the development of effective training materials
that go into the law of the particular jurisdiction in depth. A few materials
of this kind are now available and could serve as an excellent model for
similar efforts elsewhere.

1

175. A few, however, do caution the reader to supplement the general material
with the law in his own jurisdiction. See, e.g., PERKINS, ELEMENTS OF POLICE ScIENCE
220 (1942); VALLOW, POLICE ARREST AND SERcH 7 (1962).
176. CLifT, A Gum TO MODERN PoLIcE THINKING (1956), which deals with
the law of arrest and search in ch. 26; Hours, FROM ARREST TO RELEASE (1958);
VARoN, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES (1961), a two-volume work, all in
common use by police agencies, should be added to the books listed in note 175

su.pra.

177. Myren, Teaching Law to Law Enforcers, 4 Police 32, 34 (Sept.-Oct. 1959).
178. Ibid.
179. Some of the books in this category are excellent for use in a particular
jurisdiction. Thus, DAHL & BOYLE, ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1961), which has
been adopted for use by the Milwaukee Police Department, is an excellent statement of the law in Wisconsin, although it does include citations to cases elsewhere.
This book, replete with citations to Wisconsin statutes and cases, is certainly of
limited use elsewhere, although it is advertised as usable everywhere, e.g., The Police
Chief 29 (June 1963), and is sold nationally.
180. 1 ALEXANDER, THE LAW OF ARREST iii (1949). This is a two-volume work.
See also SMrr, ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1959), said to be for all law enforcement officers, though most of the citations are to Maryland cases.
181. The three best works I have uncovered are: CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GEN-
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e. Lack of Personnel Qualified to Give Effective Training

The police seldom have received outside assistance in the training
of their officers on arrest and search. As the ABA Section of Criminal Law
committee on police training has pointed out, "local bar associations generally have seldom exerted leadership to aid police administrations in
improving the caliber of law enforcement." 8 2 Local prosecutors have
sometimes given assistance'11 but typically the demands made on the prosecutor in conducting the business of his own office leaves little time for
such efforts. Most prosecutors do not conceive of their job as including a
continuing responsibility to elevate the quality of police performance through
training. And even the largest police departments are usually without
4
competent legally-trained personnel on their staffs.1
Effective police training on arrest and search law calls for a unique
combination of talents. First, "law enforcement principles which are
both legal and effective must be taught by those who understand the dayby-day problems of law enforcement down to their very roots."1 s Yet,
this is not enough. It is very important that the instructor have the
broad background and understanding of legal principles afforded by a legal

education.18 6 At present those persons who serve as police instructors
ERAL'S OFFICE, PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST AND ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE (rev.
ed. 1960); DAHL & BOYLE, ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1961) (for Wisconsin

officers); and

HALL, THE LAW OF ARREST (2d ed. 1961) (for North Carolina police).
182. Report of the Committee on Police Training and Administration, in
ABA SECTION OF CRIMINAL LAW, COMMiTTEE REPORTS 43, 44 (1956).

183. "Many prosecutors are assuming an increasing interest in participating
in the training of the police and other investigative members of law enforcement."
Edwards, supra note 136, at 94.
184. Indeed, if a request for such personnel is made, it will likely be denied

on the ground that the corporation counsel furnishes all necessary legal assistance.
This occurred recently in Chicago. See also note 191 infra.
185. Edwards, supra note 136, at 95.
186. "It is my firm belief that this is a job for a specialist-for a lawyer. Criminal law is not an isolated segment which can be lifted from its context in our legal
system and understood standing alone. It has frequently been said that our law
is a seamless web. And it's true. For example, true understanding of criminal libel
and slander is impossible without a recognition of the growing concept of right to
privacy in our tort law. As a matter of fact, this concept also has a bearing on
the developments of the last two decades in the law of search and seizure and of
wire tapping. It is true that words of a teacher of law to law enforcers might be
recorded and parroted by anyone, but this would not suffice. The breakdown would
come with the questions asked in the discussion period-and without discussion,
there is no true teaching. For this challenge: the tremendous fund of knowledge
from which the few spoken words of the lecture are chosen comes into play. This
is why a lawyer is required. The situation can be compared to an iceberg. The lecture content is that small portion of the whole which sticks above the water, but
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or prepare materials for police training typically have one but not both
of these qualifications. 1 87 The result is that the training given is usually deficient in one direction or another. The lawyer without practical experience in the law enforcement world is likely to deal in abstractions, to teach the law of arrest and search only "as a set of forbidding
rules," s88 and to ignore the practical problems of day-to-day enforcement.
On the other hand, the man with experience but without law training is
usually not in a position to use the cases and statutes effectively. 8 9
The obvious need is to develop police training personnel with the
necessary combination of experience and education to do an adequate
job.'9 It has been suggested that if police departments were provided with
legal advisors they could contribute materially to the training task'0 1

the tremendous base of broad legal knowledge is necessary to keep that portion
afloat." Myren, Teaching Law to Law Enforcers, 3 Police 48 (July-Aug. 1959).

187. A few years ago I was asked by the Chicago Police Department to prepare some training materials on arrest, search, and in-custody investigation. (These
materials appear in Chicago Police Department, Training Bulletin, vol. V, nos. 1-17
(1964).) Whatever merit these materials may have I feel is largely attributable
to the fact that I spent a good portion of the preceding summer riding with the
Chicago police and observing their problems first hand.
188. Myren, Teaching Law to Law Enforcers, 4 Police 32 (Sept.-Oct. 1959).
189. See the comment in note 186 supra.
190. See Myren, supra note 186, at 49.
191. "It seems almost unbelievable that a very substantial number of modem
police organizations operate without the skilled services of a competent legal staff.
There can be little doubt that the police deal constantly with the law on a day to
day basis. This requires current and accurate information as to the law as it exists
in the particular jurisdiction on a regular and continuing basis. It means that the
police must have available specialized legal knowledge from a person or persons
having available an extensive background in the criminal law which is kept current by a thorough examination of the case law. Only in a very small number of
the largest police departments is such legal knowledge and information available
today, but it must in the near future be made available to all but the smallest departments.
"This legal service should be a part of the department itself and not be merely
an additional duty for some city attorney who has little interest and less background in the area of the criminal law. The fact that city and county attorneys
provide adequate legal counsel in civil service matters, suits against the department
and its members and other relations with the public does not mean that adequate
counsel is available for the specialized investigative functions of the police.
"Perhaps the best solution is to provide within the department one or more
lawyers with civilian status who can attend to this important function. This
would be similar to the practice in industry where a relatively small legal department attends to the specialized internal legal needs of the corporation while litigation and the general run of legal matters are referred to outside counsel. ...
......

The legal advisor can contribute much more to the police function. He

can assist the training staff by making known changes and developments in the
pertinent law and participate directly in training activities." Sullivan, Know Your
Law, 5 Police 29, 30, (May-June 1961).
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f. Failure to Keep Current on Training Needs
Most police agencies have failed to identify the current training needs in
their respective departments. In part this attributable to the fact that significant legal developments are not studied with a view to instructing operating
personnel on the necessary changes in procedure. There is, to be sure, "a
terrific burden on keeping the system up to date"'1 2 when appellate opinions continue to define the police powers of arrest and search, but it is
a burden on which most departments have defaulted. The unmet need is
expressed as follows in one police administration text: "Recent federal and
state court decisions must be examined as soon as possible, and the department policy in light of the new decisions must be carefully explained."' 93
Equally significant, however, is the fact that most law enforcement
agencies make little or no effort to determine precisely what their existing deficiencies are in terms of compliance with arrest and search requirements. There is no feedback on the precise reason why cases are repeatedly
lost in the local courts because of suppression of evidence. 94 Most departments have failed to undertake any real effort at self-analysis by which
current deficiencies might be identified and corrected. 9 5 Nor is this analysis done by outsiders; this is probably attributable in part to the reluctance
of the police to allow such study.' 9 6 Here again is a problem that might
be solved if a police legal advisor were available. He
can and should follow all major cases through the prosecution and
trial phases and report to the command of the department on the
result of each case. In so doing he will make available for action
the lessons that are learned in this process and make it possible
192. A Forum on the Interrogation of the Accused, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 382, 386

(1964).

193. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS
TRATION 189 (5th ed. 1961).

ASSN,

MUNICIPAL

POLICE

ADMINIS-

194. See LaFave, Improving Police Performnance Through the Exclusionary
Rule-Part I: Current Police and Local Court Practices, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391,

402-03 (1965).
195. "Research is far behind training, unfortunately, in quantity, acceptance,
and application. This is the case in spite of critical need for research in all areas
of police activity-operational, technical, and administrative. There is no greater
single tool for increasing the effectiveness of manpower and resources than the discovery and application of better techniques and methods which is possible only by

means of continuous study and research." INTERNATIONAL CITY- MANAGERS Ass'N,
MUNICIPAL POLICE ADMINISTRATION 512 (5th ed. 1961).

196. Goldstein, Research and Training Needs in Police Administration, a paper
prepared for the Center for Programs in Government Administration, Univ. of
Wise., Oct. 22, 1962, p. 2.
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to avoid the repetition of mistakes in investigation and errors in
judgment 9 7
g. Lack of Quality Personnel
Finally, of course, the success of any training endeavor depends to some
degree upon the abilities of the people being trained. Police training can be
successful only if directed to those who have the ability to grasp the
information being conveyed and the judgment to act intelligently in applying this knowledge to their day-to-day tasks. Unfortunately, there is
reason to believe that many of the people now in police service do not
fit in this category.
One reason is that state standards for recruitment are now lacking;
each county, city, and village is free to set its own standards.1 9 At the
same time, local administrators are reluctant to impose high standards in
the face of a severe shortage of candidates for police service. Many departments are presently undermanned, 99 and the many prerequisites for employment-some proper, such as physical fitness, some illogical, such as
prior residency-are such that it is extremely difficult to fill the available
positions.200 Lack of adequate compensation, 20 1 along with the many unattractive facets of police work, 20 2 has made it extremely difficult for local de-

197. Sullivan, supra note 191, at 30.
198. Gourely, State Standards for Local Police Recruitment and Training, 53

J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 522 (1962).
199. For example, inMay, 1962, the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department
had an authorized strength of 2,232 but a force short of this strength by 344 officers, with 150 additional vacancies to be expected each year through normal
attrition. JOHNSON, CRIME, CORRECTION, AND SOCIETY 453 (1964).
200. Thus, during a 1-year period ending May 1962, the St. Louis department
received a total of 1,853 applicants. Of this number, only 95-which is slightly
over 5%-were accepted. The reasons. for rejection were as follows: physical, 42.1%;
education, 17.8%; no state driver's license, 10.1%; mental, 8.6%o; under or over
age, 6.2%; unsatisfactory military record, 5.3%; nonresident of Missouri, 3A%;
criminal record, 2.5%; polygraph, 2.3%; oral screening board, 1.7%. Id. at 454.
201. "Median entrance salaries range from $5,515 for the largest cities to
$4,740 for cities between 10,000 and 25,000. In most population ranges, the median
is higher than last year's. The same holds true of median maximum salaries, which
range from $5,292 to $6,514." INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGERS Ass'N, THE MUNICI-

YEAR BOOK 423 (1965).
202. Chief Parker of Los Angeles, when asked why the police were having difficulty recruiting quality personnel, replied: "I think it is because of the general
treatment accorded the police service by the American public. On the one hand,
the public has made it extremely difficult for the police officers to work in a
favorable atmosphere; on the other hand, the public has expected phenomenal rePAL.

sults from a police force working against odds." CENTER FOR STUDY OF DEMOCRATIc
INsTITUTIONS, THE POLICE 3 (1962).
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partments to attract people of real quality. Indeed, some police administra203
tors rank this as the most critical problem in police administration today.
3. What Hope for the Future?
Although the picture described above is not encouraging, there is an
increasing awareness that the quality of police training mnust be improved
if the exclusionary rule is to have its desired effect, and there have been
some signs in recent months of renewed activity in this direction.
The Ford Foundation recently has provided grants totalling 1,460,000
dollars to help strengthen the standards of police administration.20 One
grant was awarded to the International Association of Chiefs of Police for
the improvement of standards for police education both before and after
entry into service. Another grant to the Southern Police Institute will
support expansion of training and new research programs.
A grant to the University of Wisconsin Law School will be used in
part to allow law students to intern with police agencies and to support
summer seminars on police problems. Northwestern University Law School
will use its grant mainly to train lawyers for service as police legal advisors,
20 5
who, as noted above, can contribute much to effective police training.
In addition, mention must be made of the work in this area to be
done as part of the American Bar Association's Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, described earlier. 206 The Advisory Committee on
the Police Function plans to promulgate standards on the qualifications
and training of police officers. Similarly, one of the objectives of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice is
"to improve training of law enforcement personnel. ' 20 7
Recently, the Congress enacted the Law Enforcement Assistance
Act of 1965.208 The act establishes a new program under which the At203. When Chief Parker of Los Angeles was asked to identify the major problem in the police field today, he answered: "Our great difficulty is attracting sufficient numbers of young men to the police service who have the mental and physical qualifications to perform this rather intricate task in the field of human relations." Id. at 3.
204. The following information is taken from a Ford Foundation press release
dated July 2, 1964.
205. Professor Inbau of Northwestern reports that there has been no lack of
employment opportunities for the people who have completed this program to date,
which perhaps indicates an increasing awareness by police agencies and local government officials of the need for police legal advisors.
206. See p. 15 supra.
207. New York Times, July 27, 1965, p. 2, col. 6, p. 14, col. 5.
208. 79 Stat. 828 (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3891 (Sept. 22, 1965)).
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torney General is authorized to make grants for the training of persons
employed in state and local law enforcement and for projects designed to
improve the capabilities, methods, and practices of state and local agencies
responsible for law enforcement, Ten million dollars have been appropriated
for operation of this program for the next fiscal year.
These and other efforts are necessary before the quality of police
training reaches the point where it is possible for the honest and conscientious police officer to operate with maximum effectiveness. Neither
the risk of exclusion of illegally obtained evidence nor the desire to enforce the law with due regard for the rights of the people will ensure
police conduct within existing rules in the absence of sound training programs. Moreover, it is important to recognize that the quality of police
service can in turn have an impact upon the ultimate definition of the
norms of police conduct: "A law enforcement body that develops . . .
such public confidence and respect will inherit a broader latitude in which
to operate than will an agency that fails to recognize its proper role In
'20 9
the enforcement of the criminal law.
E. CONCLUSION

In the two parts of this article, appearing here and in the last issue of
this Review, I have attempted to identify the many interrelated factors
that together deprive the exclusionary rule of maximum effectiveness in
achieving its primary goal-a higher standard of police performance. This
is in no sense the statement of a case against the exclusionary rule, and
should not be viewed as such. Rather, the fundamental point is that once
committed to a sanction by which "the criminal is to go free because the
constable has blundered," as we clearly are, it becomes imperative that
we make it possible for the conscientious police officer to avoid these
blunders in the performance of his daily tasks.
This certainly is more true today than ever before. As ABA President
209. Goldstein, Guidelines for Effective Use of Police Manpower, 45 PUBLIC
218, 220 (1963). This relationship is sometimes reflected in the
literature. On the one hand, it has been said of the English police: "We like to grant
large powers so as to prevent any legal quibble about their extent, but we expect
the holders of them to act fairly and reasonably and well within them." DEVLIN,
THE CRIMINAL PRosEcUTION IN ENGLAND 16 (1958). Compare: "Among the opponents of the amendment [broadening the powers of the police in Japan] there
seems to have been this feeling: Allow the police seven miles and they will go nine
miles; therefore, if we want to keep them at seven miles, better give them six
miles." Abe, Police Detention and Arrest Privileges Under Foreign Law-Japan,
51 J. CRiM. L., C. & P.S. 429, 433 (1960).
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Powell indicated in his address on the state of the legal profession, "it
is not too much to say that crime is our nation's No. 1 domestic problem." 210
In the current law enforcement crisis, the police must know the limits of
their authority and must be induced to act within these limits, If this
can be accomplished, then perhaps we can begin, as President Johnson has
211
urged, "a thorough, intelligent and effective war against crime."
As I have tried to indicate, the problems are many, and it is apparent that much remains to be done before they can be solved. These are
not solely police problems; the police are not alone responsible for their
existence, and the police alone cannot eliminate them. The task clearly
calls for the concerted efforts of the police, other agencies of prosecution,
trial and appellate courts, legislatures, legal scholars, and, indeed, the entire
organized bar. When these efforts come to pass, we may then achieve a
level of police performance that will make possible both expert and efficient law enforcement and freedom from unwarranted official interference.
We may then say that it is more than "wishful thinking on the part of the
courts" 212 to view the exclusionary rule as an effective deterrent.
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51 A.B.A.J. 821, 826 (1965).
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